India-China Relations: Current Trends

[ word=600′]Geographical proximity, political difference, vastness of size in population and area, enviable stances at global level, faster economic development of both the two Asian giants India and China play an influential part in defining their bilateral relationship. The relationship between the two frontline countries on this part of the world is a mixed pack of conflicts and pacts, resolution and transgression.

The current trends in bilateral relationship between India and China can be analysed on the following heads.

On India’s Membership in NSG

• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) founded in 1975, is a group of 48 nuclear supplier countries that vow to prevent nuclear proliferation by means of controlling the export of materials, technology used in manufacture of nuclear weapons. It is important to note that NSG came up after India’s Pokhran Test in 1974.
• Although, backed by some powerful members of the group for its entry into the NSG, India is yet to acquire its membership. The Special conference of the NSG in June 28, 2016, which met to consider the accession of non-participants of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) into the NSG failed. China is at the forefront of opposition to India’s entry into the NSG on the ground that India has not been a signatory to NPT. Since its foundation in 1975, it is mandatory that all members of NSG should be NPT signatories.
• India wants to be the first exception to join the NSG without signing the NPT. Despite having a positive acquaintance among world powers, India’s absence in the powerful NSG is itself a diplomatic surprise.
• The India-China relationship has been lessened due to China’s opposition to India’s entry and its impact on the construction of a stronger edifice of bilateral interaction. India needs to carefully assess the pros and cons in pursuing entry into the NSG in this current phase.
• China’s opposition gave political space to other countries like Austria, Brazil, and Switzerland to voice reservation about India’s entry into NSG. China is reported to have claimed that India lacks befitting mindset of citizenry to join major powers.

ON LAC  (Line of Actual Control)

• China and India have been fraught with land border disputes since decades. China lays claim to more than 90,000 sq km in the eastern sector of the Himalayas, while India says China occupies 38,000 square km of its territory on the Aksai Chin plateau in the west.
• Tensions remain between China and India along their shared border over Arunachal Pradesh (which China asserts is part of Tibet and, therefore, of China), and over the Askai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau, despite increases in China-India political and economic relations.
• In September, 2014 the relationship took a sting as troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have reportedly entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Chumar sector.
• According Pentagon’s report of May 2016 Pakistan remains China’s primary customer for conventional weapons. The report also adds that China has increased defence capabilities and deployed more troops along the Indian border.
• China engages in both arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with Pakistan, including LY-80 surface-to-air missile systems, F-22P frigates with helicopters, main battle tank production, air-to-air missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. This has added fuel to Indo-China border issue as Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir region has been against India’s.

On Arunachal Pradesh

• India’s north-eastern border with China has been centre of bilateral tussle since decades. China considers the State of Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territory. Even if, Arunachal Pradesh has been an integral part of India since the Shimla Accord of 1914, China does not recognise the legality of that treaty, and claims most of the state as South Tibet on the basis of cultural, ethnic and geographical proximity of the State. Arunachal Pradesh has its borders with China in the north.
• China’s claims originally extended only to Tawang, a part of Arunachal Pradesh. Since the 2000s, however, China has been claiming whole of Arunachal Pradesh, a surprising claim given that independent India has been exercising sovereignty over it since 1955 (Arunachal Pradesh became a union territory in 1972 and a state in 1987).
• China resorts to a pattern of aggressive patrolling and intrusions till date along the LAC, which led to Indo-China war in 1962.
• China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh is based upon its self-proclaimed premises like it wants to put a lid on Tibetan nationalism, which it believes is fuelled by support from India, and the strategic importance of Arunachal Pradesh lying on the confluence of the international borders of People’s Republic of China (PRC), Myanmar and Bhutan.
• In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over claim of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was occupying 38,000 square kilometres of its territory in Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.
• In 2013, President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh and his reference to the State as an “integral and important part of India” generated an angry response from Beijing.
• China in February 2015 lodged a strong protest with India over Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh and expressed its staunch opposition to the trip which it said was not conducive for resolving the border dispute. China claims that its stance on the disputed area on the eastern part of the China-India border is consistent and clear. The top leadership of China indicates towards a universally recognised fact that huge disputes exist on the eastern section of China-India borders.
• It is pertinent to note here that China is yet accept the MacMahan Line between although India has accepted the Line as its international border with China since 1950.
• As per Chinese version ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ was established largely on the three areas of China’s Tibet — Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul currently under Indian illegal occupation. China considers the McMahon as illegal and establishes that the traditional customary boundary between China and India, have always been Chinese territory.
• China regularly objects to visits of Indian dignitaries to Arunachal Pradesh. China had also lodged a strong protest with India when then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had visited Arunachal Pradesh in October 2009.
• In August 2016, China threatened India with counter-measures against India’s deployment of a special version of the BrahMos Missile in the northeast. China claims that India’s deployment of supersoninc missiles on the borders has exceeded its own needs for self-defense and poses a serious threat to China’s Tibet and Yunnan provinces. It is also bound to increase competitiveness and confrontation in Sino-Indian relations and bring a negative influence to stability of the region.
• However, China’s reaction on the deployment has not impacted India’s decision to that effect. India considers its threat perceptions and security concerns of its own, and claims that deployment of assets on its territory should be no one else’s concern.

On Stapled or Paper Visa diplomacy by China

• China’s issuance of Paper Visas to people of Jammu and Kashmir and Stapled Visa to people of Arunachal Pradesh is a major concern for India. China doesn’t accept India’s claim that Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh are integral part of India.
• The practice of issuing stapled visa instead of proper visa by the Chinese embassy to Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir has been a contentious issue between the two nations. When the stamp of the country one is visiting, not placed on the passport, but on pages staple to it is called Stapled Visas. At the time the visitor leaves the country, his visa and entry and exit stamps are torn out, leaving no record on his passport.
• In 2007, China denied the application for visa from an Indian Administrative Service officer in Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country. Later in December 2007, China reversed its policy by granting a visa to MarpeSora, an Arunachal born professor in computer science.
• China considers such visa regime as ‘goodwill gesture’ butIndia considers as ‘invalid’ the stand-alone Chinese ‘paper’ visas given to some of its nationals.
• China’s stapled visa policy has prevented residents from the border state of Aruanchal Pradesh from travelling to that country, making it a contentious issue in bilateral relations.

On China’s criticism against India’s border road plan

• India has recently planned a 2, 000 km highway along the Arunachal Pradesh border from Tawang in the west to Vijaynagar in the east with China and Myanmar. The highway, is likely to cost thousands of crores of rupees, will pass through 12 districts bordering the two countries.
• However, China is critical of such plan saying that such action could complicate bilateral issues.

On Chinese Nexus with Insurgent groups in Northeast

• The nexus between China and the North-Eastern insurgent group Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) (I-M) came to limelight after the detention of a Chinese woman, Wang Qing in 2011.
• China is reported to have fanned insurgency in the strife-torn Northeast region of India by supplying them with arms and ammunitions and other assistances.

On the ‘Map World’ diplomacy

• In 2012, China officially launched its stat-run mapping website showing Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin area in J&K – the two disputed areas – as part of its own territory. The map called the Map World shows China’s borders extending up to Arunachal Pradesh while including Aksai Chi areas as part of China’s Xinijang province.
• However, India strongly reacted to such move by China, by stating that “cartographic depiction” does not change reality on the ground and asserted that Arunachal was an integral part of the country.
• India needs to take substantive measures to tackle the haunting border issue on its north with China using its diplomatic strength and growing international importance.

On UNSC Permanent Membership

• India along with Germany and Japan has been pressing for United Nations Security Council’s permanent membership since many years. Although a majority of world nations are in favour of according this prestigious status to India, China, the potential neighbour of hers, has never placed its open support for it. Chinese stance in this regard has been ambiguous since the beginning.
• Even by using veto power China sometimes acts against interest of India. In 2015 China blocked India’s move in the UN for action against Pakistan for the release of 26/11 mastermind Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi from jail.
• Being one of the permanent members of the UNSC, China could help India achieve the goal. However, China is reported to have sent a demarche to UN for putting a brake on the UNSC reforms, perhaps to check India’s entry to the Council.
• China’s ‘neither Yes nor No’ approach to India’s membership in UNSC and even NSG embitters bilateral relationship to a great extent and reaffirms the fact that nothing is going well in terms of bilateral relations between the two Asian giants.

On Indian Ocean Region

• India is the only country an ocean is named after. It best explains why India has or should have a masterly influence on the regions surrounding the Indian Ocean. During the recent times, however, China is growingly demonstrating its assertiveness and employs various strategies to maximize its interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
• China’s renewed interests in reviving the old Silk Route is a case in point. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent declaration of China’s plan for establishment of a “New 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR),” part of the ‘One Belt, One Road initiative’, is the latest initiative taken by the country for greater economic cooperation and connectivity. With the initiation of the Silk Road Fund (established in 2014) with a considerable corpus China intends to develop infrastructure along the route.
• Although India would benefit from the MSR project of China to some extent by witnessing some development in Northeast India or coastal areas of Bay of Bengal, the MSR is considered by India as a threat to India’s commercial, economic and political interest over the IOR.
• The vibrant rise of China poses major challenges to the status quo in the region with consequences for its neighbours and other powers such as the US. Many IOR countries have started adapting to rise of China in the region. In 2014, China and Djibouti signed a Defence and Security Agreement, paving the way for the establishment of China’s permanent military presence in Djibouti. Under this agreement, Djibouti offered the use of its port for the PLA Navy. Such instances of Chinese trade engagement in the IOR is the latent threat to India, which happens to be major partnering country in the region.
• With development of a number of military and civilian sea ports by China in the Indian Ocean region, enabling it to exercise increased maritime influence on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the IOR is seen as strategy to encircle India geographically. The PLA submarines as well as bigger amphibious troop carrying docking ships and aircraft have started using the Indian Ocean as their new operating grounds, and it undoubtedly pose threat to India’s security, considering the Peninsular shape and the strategic importance of Indian Ocean for India.
• The Indian Ocean is strategically important to China because of its economic stakes in the region. China imports 82 per cent of its energy requirements, in the form of oil and gas, through the Indian Ocean.About Thirty per cent of its sea trade, worth some US$300 billion each year, is shipped through the Indian Ocean.
• India Ocean holds utmost significance for India’s economic growth. India has major diplomatic, economic and military interests at stake in the India Ocean. India imports about 70 percent of its energy requirement, in the form of oil and gas, through the Indian Ocean, which is expected to increase to 95 per cent by 2025. Moreover, 77 per cent of India’s trade, by value, transits through the Indian Ocean. India has a substantial trade with Indian Ocean littoral states. Further, because of the nation’s peninsular character and geographical position, the Indian Ocean has had a preeminent impact over India’s destiny. From Security point of view, the strategic importance of Indian Ocean for India is second to none.
• Against this backdrop, India needs to take up constructive measure to ensure its enviable position in the IOR. It should forge closer diplomatic and economic relations with the Indian Ocean littoral states and other major powers. India needs to expand its power-projection capability to counter the increasing Chinese naval capability in the Indian Ocean. It also needs to enhance its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, especially around choke points.
• The potential geostrategic encirclement of India, through a combination of so-called ‘pearl’ ports in the Indian Ocean and China’s de facto alliance with Pakistan, creates a security dilemma for India. To secure itself against this possibility, India must ensure that the choke points in the Indian Ocean region remain open and free, ensuring the conditions for its continued economic growth.
• To achieve this objective, India needs to develop a range of countermeasures, including enhancing its military capability for sea control in the Indian Ocean and building alliances with interested partners to handle such a contingency. India must further develop its ‘Look East’ policy to achieve multilateral cohesion andleverage with Southeast Asian nations and other key stakeholders in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Also there is a need for closer ties with theUS, which has a common interest in ensuring that the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean remain open and free.
• India must see that China attends its legitimate concerns over the IOR and not beyond that.

On relationship with Nepal

• The Nepal’s newly formed government, led by Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (known also as Prachanda), is moving forward to strengthen bilateral ties with the country’s two giant neighbours, India and China.
• India’s relationship with Nepal is resilient and progressive for cultural, political, and geographical reasons. However, the bilateral ties between the two close neighbours received a major setback when Nepal’s trade with India was hampered greatly last year, following protests over Nepal’s new constitution. Nepal accused India of organising the trade blockade, while India claimed that protests near the border were preventing normal trade relations. During this troubled relation between India and Nepal, China, another potential neighbour of Nepal, appeared as an attractive alternative trading partner for the latter.
• Nepal, for the first time in 2015, sought to import gasoline from China, which indicates that Kathmandu would look to Beijing to decrease reliance on Indian trade.
• Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli’s long-official stay China in March 2016 forseeking investment and expanded relations with the neighbour to the north is a latent setback to India’s growing importance in the SAARC region.
• China has opened land-port between Nepal and Tibet named as Kyirong which will affect the regional strategic balance.
• Chinese growing presence in the Himalayan Kingdom is seen as ploy to reduce importance of India in the region. However, considering the historicity of Indo-Nepal relationship, India can have a substantial engagement in political and bilateral trade and commerce between the two countries. India needs to remain alert on this issue with proper stock of the ongoing development in Nepal.

On SAARC

• China is being accorded with membership in regional blocs due to its increasing economic and military might. China’s active and forceful diplomacy, voluminous trade and investments, many cooperative agreements with SAARC nations is thus enabling it to have a greater influence in south Asia. Growing space of China in regional grouping in south Asia has made inevitable on the part of India to rethink its regional strategies as it has the potential to reduce India’s clout in the pan south-Asian region.
• In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in 2005, China was granted an observer status. While other countries in the region are ready to consider China for permanent membership in the SAARC for China’s economic might and international clout, India seems reluctant.
• In November 2014 during the 18thSAARC Summit in Nepal, China pitched its voice for joining the bloc as a full-member state. Pakistan supports China’s full-membership in SAARC. It is also feared by India that all other SAARC members will join China and Pakistan to oppose the country’s interest. China’s huge and fastest growing economy acts as a major attraction for the members of SAARC.
• Against this backdrop India’s effort to block China entering the regional block should be a balancing act between China and the rest of the SAARC. Chinese economic engagement in SAARC nations, especially with Pakistan and Nepal is of great concern to India.
• The growing bond between China and Pakistan during recent times is seen as a potential deterrent to India’s dominance in the South Asian region. For instance, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which strategically aims at providing links between the overland Silk Road and maritime Silk Road and resulting major investment by China in Pakistan aggravate India’s concern.
• The deep-seated acrimony between India and Pakistan over the past decades has made SAARC a failure as an effective regional forum for economic development of member countries and regional integration. China is all agog to fish in the troubled water in the south-Asian region and thus raising its voice for full membership in SAARC.
• China’s full-membership in the SAARC may increase its importance as a regional bloc in the world for China’s global economic influence; but it will be much against the interest and hegemony of India in the bloc.
• India dominates SAARC economically and politically. India has 70 percent of size, population and resources of SAARC. China in SAARC is likely to counter India’s influence in the grouping.
• India needs to restrict China’s entry to the SAARC by having some limitation through the forum for member state with observer status and change the tone and temper of current bilateral relationship with member countries for greater engagement within the region.
• The current foreign policy of India is moving towards such goal and has ushered a new era of India-SAARC relationship.

On Economic Cooperation

• Despite having differences of stance on border issues, China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean regions and its ambivalence in supporting India’s membership in the UNSC, there is a progressive economic ties between India and China during current times.
• Both India and China have been members of various regional grouping like the BRICS and G20.
• Economic cooperation between India and China in the last decade has been a remarkable story, from very modest beginning of USD 2 billion in 2000-01 to USD 80 billion in 2015. China has become India’s largest trade partner and India is China’s seventh largest export destination.
• During recent times China’s economic policy has focused on expanded strategic cooperation with India’s neighbours. Its Silk Road ‘belt and road’ vision, initiation of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are viable measures for greater economic cooperation and engagement of China in the South-Asian region.
• India has also responded strongly to growing Chinese importance and has doubled down its outreach across South Asia, by emphasizing on extensive infrastructure development, people-to-people connectivity and a ‘lift all boats’ approach (foremost focus on general macroeconomic environment) to help India’s neighbours gain from its own rise.
• China has appeared as a top exporter of goods to the region, including to India, breaking into South Asian markets with its export-led growth strategy. Bangladesh is a good instance. By 2005, China displaced many Indian goods in Bangladesh by offering cheaper Chinese products, especially cotton and other fabrics without any restrictions. It had limited trade between India and Bangladesh. The 2015 Land Boundary Agreement between India and Bangladesh, however, positions both countries to address border issues affecting trade in the near future.
• The traditional trade gap between China and Sri Lanka and Nepal is coming closer during recent times. The trade volume between China and Sri Lanka has quadrupled since 2005 and the two countries are also negotiating an FTA to boost bilateral trade and provide better access for Sri Lankan goods in Chinese market. The same is the case with Nepal.
• As a counter-measure to Chinese investment in development progammes in South Asian regions, India made allocation of its foreign aids in the Union Budget of 2015-16 for Bhutan for realizing special economic relationship between India and Bhutan. India’s recent announcement of an additional $1 billion to Nepal for post-earthquake reconstruction establishes India’s preparedness to protect its south-Asian hegemony. Afghanistan, a member of SAARC, is also major recipient of Indian aid.

Conclusion

In fine, coexistence of geopolitical rivalry and calibrated cooperation is typical of Indo-China relationship. China is critical of a rising India in the current century and its closeness with world power like the USA and Japan and its naval cooperation in the East and South China Seas with these countries. China challenges India with myriad issues in the neighbourhood. However, an unperturbed regime of Indo-China relationship functions efficiently in transacting dialogues, managing tensions on the border through confidence-building mechanisms and maintaining high-level leadership meets. Given India’s agenda of national development and expediting economic growth to meet a number of goals, the compass of bilateral relations with China needs to be carefully set by India. It partly depends on China’s pro-India mentality.