COIN (Counter Insurgency) Strategy of Indian Government in North East

There are two components of centre’s counter insurgency (COIN) strategy in North East viz. Use of Force and Dialogue and negotiations.

Use of (proportionate) Force

In 2011, the government of India had identified 79 armed insurgent groups active in six states of North East. Half of them are splinter groups while others range from small ethnic militias to well equipped rebel armies. Many of these groups have been involved in formal as well as informal talks with the Government. Their aspirations, demands and activities vary greatly. More than half of the groups are in Manipur. The states of Nagaland, Assam and Tripura also have long-established armed groups. There are groups in Mizoram as well as Arunachal Pradesh, where insurgency is at lower levels since the Mizo peace accords of 1987.

Here are important observations and issues with Militarisation and counter-insurgency in North East:

• The first notable thing is that only a handful of the total 79 armed groups have been formally called “terrorist organizations”. These terrorist organizations are generally those which have a political programme of greater autonomy or independence. Many of the smaller groups are tolerated mainly because of their opposition to the independence seeking groups.
• The history of counter-insurgency in North East is as old as insurgencies themselves. India’s oldest paramilitary force Assam Rifles was set up to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the north-eastern region and other areas, where deemed necessary, under the control of the Army.
• North East India is highly militarised since the Second World War. More troops were stationed permanently after the Indo-China war in the early 1960s. The counter insurgency operations were at their peak in 1970s and again in 1990s when more and more troops and paramilitary forces were deployed to the region to contain the insurgencies and remained there permanently. Large battalions have also been established to police the borders with China, Burma and Bangladesh.
• However, the Government of India has proportionately used Indian Army in its Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategies. Indiscriminate use of forces has been avoided mainly because groups such as ULFA, the NSCN (IM), the UNLF and the PLA project a certain degree of social support and any disproportionate use of force can be counter-productive. In this context, the below operations are worth note:
  • In 1990, the government conducted Operations Rhino and Bajrang against ULFA, NSCN, NDFB, Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) etc. The insurgents relocated their camps to Bhutan. India exerted diplomatic pressure on Bhutan. Initially Bhutan tried to resolve the issue peacefully but soon, Bhutan realized that peaceful talks would not be able to drive out the militia from its territory. Consequently, Royal Bhutan Army conducted the first operation ever called “Operation All Clear”. This led to death and capture of several militants.
  • Many of the militants fled to Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh also under the diplomatic pressure captured and handed over to India several militant leaders including Arabinda Rajkhowa and Anoop Chetia of ULFA.

Assam has witnessed the gradual change in its overall counter-insurgency strategy due to the measured military responses by the army after the 1990s. In the recent years, the attitude of the locals has also changed but still Indian army is routinely accused of human rights violations. There has been a social apathy against counter-insurgency operations and militarization of society. Due to the public resistance to armed operations, an all out operations against the armed outfits has never been used in north east.

Dialogue and Negotiations

The dialogue and negotiations have always been a serious alternative option for the Indian state’s response to the armed conflicts in the Northeast.

• In the Naga conflict, the dialogue started as early as 1947 with the Akbar Hydri agreement, the civil society interactions of the 1950s, the Naga Peace Mission of 1964, the Shillong Accord of 1975 and the now ongoing peace negotiations with the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN (K).
• In the ULFA case, the jailed ULFA leaders have been released followed by “unconditional talks” with the outfit falling within the framework of negotiations. In 2011, ULFA submitted to the Centre its charter of demands which sought amendment in the Constitution for finding “meaningful” ways to protect the rights and identity of the indigenous people of Assam. ULFA’s other demands include discussion on grounds for its struggle, status report on missing ULFA leaders and cadres (numbering around 50) and other socio-economic issues.
• In 2011, a tripartite agreement for Suspension of Operations (SoO) was signed among the Centre, the Assam government and ULFA. According to the pact, both the ULFA and the security forces will not carry out operations against each other. According to this pact, the members of the rebel group, around 600 in number, will be put in special camps which will be called “nabanirman kendras.” However, ULFA has denied surrendering arms and ammunitions.
• In 2015, the NDA Government has signed the framework agreement on peace with NSCN-IM.