Bench System in Indian Courts
While some judgements become popular due to the decisions given by the judges, a hidden player in adjudication of disputes is the strength of Bench. For this reason, the Bench strength has been specified in the Supreme Court Rules.
History of Bench Strength
When Supreme Court of India began functioning in the year 1958, it started with eight judges (the Chief Justice and seven other judges). They used to sit in 2-3 judges per Bench. The question of five or more judges sitting for questions of constitutional importance first came up in the deliberations of the Drafting Committee in 1948 with proviso in Article 121(2) (now Article 145(3)) that provided ‘it shall be the duty of every judge to sit for deciding any case involving a substantial question of law to the interpretation of this Constitution.’ Justice Felix Frankfurter of US had also advised Sir BN Rau that the Supreme Court should sit in such a manner that the finality and authoritativeness of its decisions is ensured for the future issues.
But as the Supreme Court started entertaining a variety of matters starting from disputes concerning original jurisdiction to those involving appellate jurisdiction, an increase in the number of judges became a necessity. At present, the Court has a strength of 30 judges (Chief Justice and 29 other judges). The Bench usually sits in 2 or 3 judges per Bench except in case of Constitutional matters wherein Article 145(3) of the Constitution clearly states that there must be five judges Bench for deciding questions of Constitutional importance. But the incidence of 2-3 judges Bench has taken a toll over the last 10 years with Constitutional Benches sitting at only 8 in a year as compared to 100 five judge or larger benches in a year in the later 1960s.
Importance of Bench Strength
The Constitutional Benches play a very key role in shaping the future polity and rights of the people in a country. A good example of this can be illustrated in the matters coming up under Article21 like the Naz Foundation case on LGBT rights, constitutionality of levying entry tax etc. The importance of larger Benches of the Constitution was also highlighted in the 229th Report of the Law Commission in 2009 by stating that constitutional adjudication involves questions of politics, economics and social policies apart from the disputes that involve purely legal matters, so there is a need to increase the number of Constitution Benches.
Current Position in India
As stated earlier, the recent years have witnessed a significant decline in larger Constitutional Benches, with Court preferring to deal with matters of less Constitutional importance. Witnessing this position Nick Robinson of US has called Supreme Court of India as polyvocal owing to the fact that it speaks through several individual Benches and does not have a single voice unlike the US Supreme Court. A polyvocal court is a court wherein every Bench has a different interpretation of law than the other. This has an impact on both the litigants and the lawyers. Some of the problems that arise out of this are:
Problems in the lower courts
The lower courts which depend on the decisions of the Supreme Court for precedence suffer a lot as a result of inconsistency in the decisions of the ape court owing to small judge benches. One example is the matter relating to the levying of entry tax. Different benches have come out with different opinions. Based on the different opinions, the High Court of Calcutta concluded that entry tax is unconstitutional but the Allahabad High Court found the same constitutional. Owing to these widespread confusions the Apex Court finally constituted a five judge Bench to decide on the interpretation of Part XIII of the Constitution in the case of Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. v State of Madhya Pradesh.
Variation in arguments
Lawyers have often been found to have used this situation to argue before multiple Benches comprising of different judges in order to try their luck. This not only increases the pendency of cases but also increases the financial burden on the litigants. Thus, it has resulted in judgement trade-off with atleast one Bench giving a favourable opinion to the lawyer. It also puts some well-to-do litigants on a higher platform who can seek the help of multiple Benches than the poor ones who need to be satisfied with one judgement even if it is against their interest. This leads to serious implications on the legitimacy of the Court as an icon for rendering justice.
Pendency of cases
If a single issue is argued before different forums, the dispute keeps stretching without arriving at a finality on the decision. These disputes finally reach a Constitutional Bench but not before a sufficient backlog of cases have been created.
Overburdened Court
One of the key reasons for not constituting larger Benches is due to the number of cases before the Courts as compared to the number of judges. So there is a preference to distribute the work as much as possible to dispose them faster. The Supreme Court in recent years has almost been placed to a position of court of appeal with every matter rushing to its doorsteps.
Blatant inconsistency
The inconsistency in the lower Bench judgements was clearly highlighted in two instances-in the matter of Right to Education Act, 2009 (Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust and Ors. v Union of India) and legalizing euthanasia (Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v Union of India) wherein the Constitutional Bench of five judges had to interfere in the end. But the matters which could have been solved in one go by the larger Bench got delayed owing to trial and error by the Benches.
Comment
Bench strength plays a key role under Article 141 of the Constitution and also has social impacts. One of the biggest reasons that prevents larger Benches from sitting is that of determination of a question of substantial Constitutional importance. The current situation wherein 754 cases of Constitutional importance are pending, calls for immediate action by the Court to constitute larger Benches and give attention to these major issues.
