Indian Coastal Security Apparatus: Key Features and Progress post 26/11
Serious doubts were raised on India’s Coastal security framework in the aftermath of 26-11-2008 Mumbai attacks. There was a need for complete overhaul of the coastal security system of the country. This article briefly reviews the changes in security apparatus, coastal security scheme and lacunae in the same.
Key features of Indian coastal security
India has a three tier security system made of Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and Marine Police. Indian navy is responsible for protecting the outermost areas of India’s territorial waters beyond 200 nautical miles. Indian Coast Guard safeguards the intermediate layer (between coast and 12 nautical miles of territorial waters to 200 nautical miles. Marine police safeguards the shallow coastlines and inland waters within 12 nautical miles. This three tier arrangement works under the comprehensive and integrated Coastal Security Scheme.
Further, the scheme also focuses on strengthening infrastructure of Marine Police Force of all coastal States/UTs. Under this scheme, investment is to be made to increase manpower, surveillance assets, interceptor boats and ships; radar stations, Joint Operation Centres for monitoring the marine activities in the near seas. These are supplementing the intelligence networks and information banks that have been set up for detection of signs of subversion in the coastal waters. These have been set up at Mumbai, Kochi, Port Blair and Vishakapatnam.
This apart, the government is conducting defence exercises and trying to involve the general stakeholders in the process of maintaining security. The fishing community is considered to be the best stakeholder in this regard. So, the community has been asked to keep its eyes and ears open on any suspicious activity that they notice in the seas at the time of fishing. This has been done through spreading of awareness in them through various coastal security campaigns that were extensively undertaken after the attacks.
How far has the Efforts been successful?
In 2011, two years after the incident, there was an entry of three massive vessels in Mumbai which included a container ship by the name MV Wisdom which contained 7025 tonnes of deadweight, MV Pravit containing 1000 tonnes of the materials. But these went unnoticed by this huge set up of surveillance. In the latter case the information of the drifting was given by the fishermen but the response was received only after 14 hours. This story explains the situation of the security system. These were only small incidents, which indicate a high chance of failure when a similar 26/11 like situation arises. We can summarize the identified lacunae in the system as follows:
Deficiency in infrastructure
Although so many items of security infrastructure are in place there is a discrepancy in their use. The patrol boats are under-utilized, there is a shortage of manpower and huge amount of funds remains unspent. The navy and coast guard has been struggling to bridge the financial deficits that they face.
Uneven nature of the coastal security narrative
There has been a flaw in the setting up of priorities for various maritime agencies and consequently the flawed understanding of progress in security. There has been a focus on huge infrastructure more. This is indicated by the joint exercises in the Arabian Sea, the coastal radar chains, the National Command and Control Communications Intelligence Network, Maritime Domain Awareness Plan and the Information Management and Analysis Centre. These are only high profile undertakings, but basic steps like prompt action in case of information received and regular patrolling by coast guards. The lack of integration of the marine police in the system is also a root cause of the problem.
Lack of apex authority
There is no apex maritime authority that controls all operations. The National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security which coordinates the coastal security activities of the maritime agencies is merely an ad-hoc arrangement. The enactment of the Coastal Security Bill which could have provided a well-defined structure to coastal security has also not been taken forward.
Disagreements
Some disagreements have occurred in the functioning of the surveillance systems. While the security agencies have preferred active tracking of individual fishing boats through onboard transponders for e-surveillance, the state maritime board officials seek a satellite tracking system.
Thus, there is an urgent need to address the lacunae in the coastal security system in order to avoid such a massive terror attack on the heart of India. It can be done best through a strong political will towards increased defence.
